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Abstract 
 
This paper employs the concept of ‘defence news’ proposed by Ramey (2009) to develop a time 
series of shocks to UK defence spending in the interwar period at a quarterly frequency.  ‘Defence 
news’ is the present value of changes to defence spending plans.  Information on this is taken from 
contemporary sources, in particular, The Economist.  The estimates in this paper can be used as an 
input to assessing the size of the fiscal multiplier in interwar Britain as in Crafts and Mills (2012). 
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1. Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to document the construction of a series for changes in the expected present 
value of government expenditure on defence for the United Kingdom in the interwar period.  It is 
constructed using a similar method to that employed by Ramey (2009) to obtain estimates which are 
the key ingredient for her method of obtaining estimates of government spending multipliers 
(Ramey, 2011).  The key place from which information was taken is The Economist magazine which 
was published weekly through the interwar period.  This source published details of defence 
estimates which were usually published in government papers in February and March each year but 
there were sometimes also supplementary estimates.  The Economist gave a detailed yearly account 
of actual spending at the time of the annual budget in April and published quarterly running totals at 
the beginning of January, April, July and October each year and it also regularly commented on the 
prospects for defence spending in editorials and in featured news items.   
The statistical information obtained from The Economist has been cross-checked against the detailed 
descriptions of British budgets in Mallet and George (1929) (1933) and Sabine (1970).  Interpretation 
of the commentary of The Economist has been facilitated by the accounts in the major historical 
studies of military policy such as Ferris (1989) and Peden (1979).  As will be apparent, the general 
pattern of the news is quite clear but, of course, there is a margin of error in the details.  At times, 
there was considerable uncertainty not simply for agents in the private sector but also among 
policymakers as to what would happen both with regard to magnitudes and timing, especially in the 
early 1920s and the later 1930s, and judgment calls are unavoidable.  Expected values have been 
calculated at 1938 prices for a horizon of 5 years using a discount rate of 5.1 per cent.1  Crafts and 
Mills (2012) show that the ‘defence news’ variable obtained by this procedure is a good leading 
indicator of future defence expenditure. 
2. News in The Economist 
November 1, 1919: the Chancellor of the Exchequer has produced a forecast of government 
expenditure in a ‘normal year’ at current prices (Cmd. 376).  This shows an annual outlay of £135 
million (of which Navy = £60 million, Army and Air Force = £75 million).  This is based on the notion 
that there will be no preparations for a major war before 1929 (the 10-year rule). 
March 20, 1920:  The defence estimates for 1920/1 are now complete and are well above the 
‘normal year’ envisaged in Cmd. 376: Army £125 million, Navy £84.6 million, Air Force 21.1 million. 
April 24, 1920:  The budget statement confirms that total defence spending for 1920/1 is expected 
to be £230.4 million. 
July 3, 1920:  The Chancellor has revisited his estimates of expenditure in a ‘normal year’ and the 
defence component is unchanged (Cmd. 779).  There is no editorial comment to suggest that this is 
implausible. 
This information allows an initial projection of defence spending based on the concept of the normal 
year and the apparent pace of cuts carried out during 1919/20 and contemplated for 1920/1.  During 
                                                          
1
 Figures in current prices have been converted to constant 1938 prices using the monthly retail price index in 
Capie and Collins (1983), Table 2.13 and the discount rate is 1.25% per quarter. 
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1919/20 expenditure was cut at about 30% per quarter; if this falls to 15% per quarter during 
1920/1, that year’s Defence Estimate will be fulfilled and the steady state (‘normal year’) will be 
achieved in 1921/2 when spending at 1938 prices will total £93.5 million. The sequence of spending 
at 1938 prices is as follows: 
  1920Q1 51.2 1921 26.8 
  1920Q2 43.6 1921Q2 23.4 
1919Q3 104.6 1920Q3 37.0 1921Q3 et seq. 23.4 
1919Q4 73.2 1920Q4 31.4 NPV 461.4 
 
There has been no surprise and so there is no news. 
December 18, 1920:  A supplementary defence estimate of £48.2 million has been presented this 
week.  The Economist believes there will be some additional extra spending on top of this during the 
financial year.  The actual outturn at the end of the fiscal year confirms this with a further £11.6 
million. 
Already by 1920Q4 it is clear that defence spending for 1920/1 has to be revised up.  It seems 
appropriate to assume that the outcome is more or less known. This implies that the sequence of 
spending becomes the following: 
  1921Q1 46.1 
  1921Q2 23.4 
  1921Q3et seq. 23.4 
1920Q4 48.7 NPV 463.8 
 
At this point, the previous sequence implied an NPV = 427.8 so the news in 1920Q4 = + 36.0. 
December 25, 1920:  The Economist predicts that defence spending in fiscal 1921/22 can still be 
reduced to about £200 million (£140 million in 1938 prices).  This would, however, mean that the 
steady-state figure of £93.5 million at 1938 prices will be missed by a long way. 
April 30, 1921: The defence estimate for 1921/22 is £193.4 million (£138.7 million in 1938 prices) 
close to the predictions of The Economist already formed at the end of 1920. The Economist 
expresses strong scepticism that serious efforts will be made to reduce expenditure in future.  Ferris 
(1987) notes that the armed forces were in no way reconciled to the Treasury’s idea of a normal 
year’s spending and that their ambitions might cost £190 million – something like the 1921/22 
estimate – and that the Treasury appeared to be losing this argument given perceived threats to 
security but had not given up seeking eventually to return to the 1919 commitment to a £135 million 
normal year.  At the same time it is clear that the Treasury cannot give up the fight given the parlous 
state of British public finances.  [Actual expenditure of £189.5 million for 1921/22 turned out to be 
close to the budget estimate.] 
It seems clear that by 1921Q1 expectations are switching to a belief that it will take the Treasury a 
long time to enforce the ‘normal year’.  This implies that a significant upward revision in expected 
defence spending is called for but perhaps not that the forces will be able to resist further cuts 
forever.  It is quite difficult to form a projection.  The assumptions made here are that it is assumed 
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further defence cuts beyond the wishes of the armed forces are postponed till 1922/3 and then 
resume at a slower pace of 2.5% per quarter until the steady state is reached in 1926Q1.  This implies 
the following sequence of defence expenditure at 1938 prices: 
1921Q1 46.1 1923Q1 31.3 1925Q1 25.6 
1921Q2 34.7 1923Q2 30.6 1925Q2 25.0 
1921Q3 34.7 1923Q3 29.8 1925Q3 24.3 
1921Q4 34.7 1923Q4 29.0 1925Q4 23.7 
1922Q1 34.7 1924Q1 28.3 1926Q1 et seq. 23.4 
1922Q2 33.8 1924Q2 27.6 NPV  551.6 
1922Q3 33.0 1924Q3 26.9   
1922Q4 32.2 1924Q4 26.2   
 
The previous sequence implied an NPV = 439.2 so the news in 1921Q1 = +112.4. 
August 6, 1921: A committee of businessmen chaired by Sir Eric Geddes will be appointed with a 
mandate to propose cuts to government expenditure.  This was asked to produce economies of £100 
million in projected 1922/3 supply services expenditure. 
February 4, 1922: The cuts proposed by Geddes, including those for defence, are expected to be 
diluted. 
February 18, 1922:  Proposals so far from the Geddes Committee have identified cuts in expenditure 
of £75 million of which £46.5 million would be on defence.  It suggests that Army and Navy 
manpower should be reduced by 50,000 and 35,000, respectively. 
February 25, 1922:  The Final Report from the Geddes Committee is to cut £86.8 million but the total 
will approach £100 million by including £11 million from battleships which will not be built as a result 
of the Washington Conference. 
March 4, 1922:  The Chancellor of the Exchequer has announced the government’s response to the 
Geddes Report.  Their proposed total reduction in defence expenditure of £58.5 million will be cut 
back to £38 million. 
March 25, 1922: The Defence Estimates for 1922/23 have been published and add up to a total of 
£138.5 million. 
May 6, 1922: The budget provision for defence expenditure in 1922/23 is £138.1 million which is 
£69.5 million lower than the comparable figure of a year ago.  Further cuts in government spending 
will be needed next year if the budget is to be balanced. 
The key issues are at what point the Geddes outcome could be predicted and how far the 
government’s renewed determination to look for cuts brings forward the date of the ‘normal year’.  
These are tricky judgement calls.  I assume that the outcome is already predictable in 1921Q3 at 
which point the normal year is now expected to be reached in 1924/25 with the pace of cuts at 5% 
per quarter during 1923/24.  This implies an expectation in 1921Q3 of the following sequence of 
defence spending in 1938 prices:  
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  1922Q1 34.7 1923Q1 29.6 1924Q1 24.1 
  1922Q2 29.6 1923Q2 28.1 1924Q2 et seq. 23.4 
1921Q3 34.7 1922Q3 29.6 1923Q3 26.7 NPV 483.4 
1921Q4 34.7 1922Q4 29.6 1923Q4 25.4   
 
The previous sequence implied an NPV of £520.1 so the news in 1921Q3 = -36.7.  
October 7, 1922:  Figures for defence spending over the first 6 months of the fiscal year show a total 
of £52.2 million.  Allowing for falling prices, this is about 68 per cent of the previous year whereas 
the project ion at the time of the budget had been about 87 per cent. 
This is news that defence is being cut more rapidly than expected.  The eventual outturn for 1922/3 
was £111.0 million which at 1938 prices was £96.5 million or about 81.5% of the budget estimate – 
the closest the government would ever get to the £93.5 million ‘steady state’ and a little over the full 
Geddes cut.  The spring of 1922 was a period when the Treasury briefly gained the upper hand in its 
ongoing struggle with the services and at last expects to be able to implement its idea of the 10-year 
rule (Ferris, 1987).  However, in November 1922 the Conservatives won the election after the break-
up of the previous coalition government and this may well be seen as good news for the services.  It 
seems best to regard the lower defence spending in 1922/3 as a temporary reduction.  This is borne 
out in the following spring when the defence estimates for 1923/4 are £122 million or £112.3 million 
at 1938 prices, virtually the same as the £112.5 million projected in 1921Q3. 
In 1922Q4, the sequence of defence spending in 1938 prices is now expected to be: 
  1923Q1 23.8 1924Q1 24.1 
  1923Q2 28.1 1924Q2 et seq. 23.4 
  1923Q3 26.7 NPV 428.3 
1922Q4 24.1 1923Q4 25.4   
 
  The previous sequence implied an NPV of 439.2 so the news in 1922Q4 is -10.9. 
January 6, 1923: Defence spending in the first 3 quarters of the fiscal year totals £79.0 million.  This 
is what would have been expected on the basis of the first 2 quarters. 
March 10, 1923: The Economist predicts that the Defence Estimate for 1923/24 will be £125 million 
based on published figures for the Air Force and the Navy and a guess at the Army figure. 
April 21, 1923: The Defence estimate in the budget is £122 million or £112.1 million at 1938 prices.  
This is a reduction of £16 million compared with the previous year (mostly accounted for by price 
falls) but £11 million above the outturn for 1922/23. 
Ferris (1987) notes that after Baldwin took over as the Prime Minister in May 1923 the Air Force and 
the Navy successfully argued that the appropriate interpretation of the 10-year rule in their cases 
was that they should be fully ready for a major conflict by 1929.  They persuaded the government to 
approve rearmament programmes to raise the number of RAF squadrons to 52 and to allow the navy 
to build 30 cruisers.  Ferris (1987) sees Baldwin as approving the greatest rearmament programme 
of the interwar period prior to 1936.  This would imply defence spending rising by £35 million per 
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year from 1926/27 but a further election was in the offing and it might be supposed unlikely that this 
programme would go ahead in full if the government lost (as it did).  The new government led by 
MacDonald did not endorse the rearmament programmes in full but allowed them to begin in 1924.  
It is hard to know exactly what all this means for future defence spending but it seems reasonable to 
suppose that further cuts are unlikely supposing around half the extra post 1926 spending comes 
through, and that the ‘normal year’ will never materialize. The sequence of defence spending in 
1923Q2 is taken to be £112.1 million at 1938 prices throughout the 5 year horizon so the NPV = 499.6 
compared with the previous estimate of 427.2 so the news is +72.4. 
October 6, 1923:  Defence spending in the fiscal year so far is £46.4 million compared with £52.2 
million a year earlier. 
January 5, 1924: Defence spending is £69.0 million in the first 3 quarters of the fiscal year compared 
with £79.0 million a year ago.  The Economist expects that ‘very substantial savings’ on the Estimate 
of £122.0 million will be made in the year as a whole.  In the end, the outturn is £105.8 million. 
The Economist is not predicting that there will be a retreat from the rearmament programme.  The 
previous year’s experience suggests that it may be best to see the savings as a temporary reduction.  
If we suppose that by 1923Q4 the rest of the year’s savings can be predicted but then spending 
returns to the new normal, then the sequence of spending at 1938 prices is the following: 
  1924Q1 27.6 
  1924Q2 et seq. 28.0 
  NPV 498.7 
1923Q4 27.6   
 
The defence news in 1923Q4 is -0.9. 
March 8, 1924: The Economist predicts that the Defence Estimate for 1924/25 to be announced by 
the new minority Labour government will be £114.5 million with the main saving (£7 million) coming 
from the Army. 
May 3, 1924: The Defence Estimate for 1924/25 announced in the budget is £115.3 million which is 
£103.9 million at 1938 prices.  This year the outturn is almost the same at £114.7 million. 
So with a new government we do not seem to be going back to the old steady state but perhaps the 
new normal is not quite as high as seemed likely last year.  How long the minority government will 
last is unclear (it turns out to be only till the end of October 1924 when the Conservatives win a new 
election with a large majority).  Perhaps it is right to reduce expected spending for 1925/26 onwards 
slightly and we assume that in 1938 prices it is midway between the old long-run estimate and this 
year’s figure at £108 million in 1938 prices. So the sequence of defence expenditure at 1938 prices is 
now as follows: 
  1925Q1 26.0 
1924Q2 26.0 1925Q2 27.0 
1924Q3 26.0 1925Q3 et seq. 27.0 
1924Q4 26.0 NPV 477.5 
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The previous estimate was 499.6 so the news in 1924Q2 = -22.1. 
February 7, 1925:  The navy is asking for the construction of 8 more cruisers to add to the 5 
authorized by the previous government.  It is thought that the Air Force and Navy are asking for an 
additional £3 million and £10 million, respectively. 
March 14, 1925:  Estimated expenditure of defence in the next fiscal year is now £120.5 million, an 
increase of £5.2 million, mostly on the Navy.  This is the actual figure in the budget presented on 
April 28 and is equivalent to £107.8 million at 1938 prices.  The outturn is £119.4 million. 
This suggests the assumptions of a year ago remain valid. The cabinet now accepts the Treasury’s 
interpretation of the 10 year rule (Ferris, 1987) and its application is to be extended indefinitely in 
1928 (Peden, 1979).  In sum, there is no news in 1925Q2 and the NPV remains at 481.4 based on a 
constant £108 million at 1938 prices. 
March 6, 1926:  The Defence Estimates show a reduction for next year of about £4 million. 
May 1, 1926: This is confirmed in the budget where defence spending for the year 1926/27 is 
estimated at £116.6 million or £105.7 million at 1938 prices.  The outturn is £116.7 million. 
The absence of any substantive announcement about future plans suggests that we regard this as no 
news. 
March 12, 1927:  The Defence Estimates for 1927/28 are £115.1 million or £108.4 million at 1938 
prices. 
April 16, 1927:  The budget confirms a Defence Estimate of £115.1 million.  The Economist 
comments that the Chancellor (Churchill), in effect, ‘threw up the sponge’ with regard to trying to 
reduce armaments expenditure.  It is noted that there may have to be a supplementary estimate of 
a few millions to pay for an expeditionary force in China.  The outturn is £117.4 million. 
June 25, 1927: The Economist discusses the implication of recent parliamentary reviews of the 
armed forces.  The bottom line is that there is no scope for further economies unless there is a 
change of policy. 
This confirms that it continues to be reasonable to maintain an assumption of steady-state spending 
maintained at £108 million per year in 1938 prices.  The news in 1927Q2 is no change in the medium 
term but a small supplement this year; we assume this is + £2.2 million at 1938 prices, the excess of 
the outturn over the estimate. 
April 28, 1928: The budget contains Defence Estimates of £114.6 million equivalent to £108.1 million 
at 1938 prices.  The individual services are little changed.  The eventual outturn is £113.5 million. 
There is no news in 1928Q2. 
July 7, 1928:  The Economist comments that in the absence of a change in policy there is no scope 
for a reduction in real defence spending. 
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April 13, 1929:  The Defence Estimates in the budget next week add up to £112.6 million equivalent 
to £107.1 million at 1938 prices.  The Economist comments that ‘the gigantic cost of armaments has 
undergone disappointingly small reduction over the last 5 years’. 
There is no news in 1929Q2. 
March 8, 1930:  There is some uncertainty about future shipbuilding programmes until the results of 
the Naval Conference are known.  Next year’s construction of ships has been reduced by £3 million. 
April 19, 1930: The Defence Estimates in the budget are as expected and total £110.1 million 
equivalent to £109.8 million at 1938 prices.  The eventual outturn is £110.5 million. 
There is no change in policy and the only issue is how far nominal expenditure adjustments match 
price changes.  It seems reasonable to conclude that there is no news in 1930Q2. 
February 14, 1931:  Amidst serious concern about a deterioration of the public finances resulting 
from the recession, the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Snowden) of the minority Labour government 
has announced that there will be a new ‘Geddes Axe’ committee to propose cuts in public 
expenditure. 
March 7, 1931:  The Navy estimates show construction of new ships to continue at the reduced 
1930/13 level. 
March 21, 1931: The members of the committee to review public expenditure have been announced 
and the Chairman is Sir George May.  The terms of reference are ‘satisfactorily wide’; the committee 
is to make recommendations for all possible reductions in expenditure on supply services.  There is a 
prospective deficit of £47 million for 1931/32.  The Economist thinks this should be addressed 
through raising taxes and in due course reducing unemployment benefits. 
April 18, 1931:  The budget on April 27 will contain Defence Estimates of £109.6 million equivalent 
to £117.6 million at 1938 prices.  (After autumn cuts, the outturn is £107.3 million.  This is equivalent 
to £115.1 million at 1938 prices.) 
These are mixed messages.  Real expenditure is rising but the May Committee could well address 
this during the year.  At this point, it seems reasonable to guess that the constant prices £108 million 
will be exceeded this year by the actual £7.1 million but that subsequently the steady state will be 
re-imposed.  The defence news in 1931Q2 is that NPV is 488.4 (+7.0). 
August 8, 1931: The proposals of the May Committee include immediate reductions in annual pay 
for the armed services of £2.9 million and sundry reductions in annual defence expenditures of 
about £1 million. 
September 12, 1931:  A White Paper (Cmd. 3952) to accompany the supplementary budget of 
September 10 has been issued on behalf of the new National Government which indicates the 
effects of proposed economies in the full financial year 1932/33.  Defence expenditure will be 
reduced by £5 million in addition to cuts in pay and pensions of £3.6 million. 
We assume that there is no news here given the adjustment already made in 1931Q2. 
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April 9, 1932:  The Defence Estimates for the April 19 budget are £104.4 million which is equivalent 
to £115.0 million at 1938 prices.  This is only £5.2 million below the figure of a year earlier even 
though the economies in the supplementary budget have in the main been realized.  The major 
reason for this discrepancy is an increase in expenditure on naval construction programmes.  The 
eventual outturn for 1932/33 is £103.0 million or £113.5 million at 1938 prices. 
This suggests that medium-term assumptions may need to be revised.  In March 1932 a cabinet 
committee recommended that the 10-year rule should be cancelled, following the invasion of 
Manchuria and attack on Shanghai by Japan.  (German rearmament is not yet an issue.)  The 
Chancellor of the Exchequer (Chamberlain) seems to have expected that defence expenditure would 
rise by about 10% to £115 million by 1935 (Peden, 1979) and naval construction is back on the 
agenda.  We assume that the 1932/33 outcome is anticipated followed by a steady build-up to a 10% 
higher level in 1935/36.   The sequence of defence expenditure at 1938 prices then becomes the 
following: 
 
  1933Q1 28.2 1934Q1 29.2 1935Q1 30.2 
1932Q2 28.2 1933Q2 29.2 1934Q2 30.2 1935Q2 et seq. 31.2 
1932Q3 28.2 1933Q3 29.2 1934Q3 30.2 NPV 533.4 
1932Q4 28.2 1933Q4 29.2 1934Q4 30.2   
 
The NPV of 533.4 replaces an estimate on previous steady-state assumptions of 481.4 so the news in 
1932Q2 is + 52.0. 
March 11, 1933:  The Economist comments on ‘the retrograde tendency towards an increase in 
defence expenditure’ which is highlighted by the Navy Estimates which have risen by £3 million and 
entail a construction programme for 1933 which includes 4 cruisers, 9 destroyers and 3 submarines 
even though the First Lord thinks these do not fully provide for the potential needs of the Navy. 
April 15, 1933: The Defence Estimates to be included in the budget add up to £108.9 million 
equivalent to £121.0 million at 1938 prices and about £6 million above last year’s spending.  Any 
impact of the May Committee on defence spending has been temporary as is illustrated by the Army 
Estimate.  The Economist notes that this is only £0.6 million at current prices below the expenditure 
on the Army in 1931/32 (a small increase in real terms) whereas the proposal of September 1931 
would have cut £3.5 million. The outturn is £107.9 million. 
This level of expenditure surely confirms that there has been a permanent shift upwards compared 
with the normal level of the late 1920s.  The acceleration is a bit more than that envisaged in the 
projection of a year ago but probably within the noise.  Leave NPV unchanged – there is no news in 
1933Q2. 
March 10, 1934:  The Defence Estimates have been published; they show an increase of £4.8 million.  
The Economist thinks that the Air Estimates are the most interesting to watch for signs of impending 
rearmament and 2 new squadrons are to be added. 
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April 14, 1934: the Defence Estimates at £113.7 million for 1934/35 are £4.1 million above the 
original estimate for 1931/32 and equivalent to £124.5 million at 1938 prices.  The eventual outturn 
is £113.9 million. 
The growth in defence spending is still ahead of the schedule assumed 2 years ago but not by much 
and with no major announcements of new commitments.  The Cabinet had been presented with a 
proposal (which was still under discussion) by the Defence Requirements Committee to raise 
expenditure by £77 million in the next 5 years to remedy the worst deficiencies in the armed forces 
(Peden, 1979).  It is a judgement call but this is taken to be no news in 1934Q2. 
July 28, 1934: The government has announced that it will increase the Air Force by 41 squadrons 
over the next 5 years.   
The signs that The Economist has been looking for are now apparent.  Peden (1979) reports that the 
Cabinet had agreed to a 5-year £57 million spending programme (scaled down from £77 million).  
The next year’s Defence Estimate will reflect this with spending equivalent to £136 million at 1938 
prices in 1935/36.  It seems reasonable to assume that this will be the new normal.  The sequence of 
defence spending at 1938 prices is now assumed to be the following: 
  1935 31.1 
  1935Q2 et seq. 34.0 
1934Q3 31.1 NPV 597.5 
1934Q4 31.1   
 
The previous assumptions entailed NPV = 553.2 so the news in 1934Q3 is + 44.3. 
December 1, 1934: Churchill has made a high-profile speech asking the government what it intends 
to do to counter the German rearmament of the last 18 months.  The reply (from Baldwin) is that 
the air programme will be accelerated and 22 squadrons will be formed in 1935 and 1936. 
March 9, 1935: The Defence Estimates have been published and show an increase of £10.5 million is 
planned.  This includes the previous announcements of new squadrons for the RAF.  The Economist 
notes that these come in the wake of the government’s decision to abandon hope of disarmament 
and comments that ‘Within the limits of the policy of rearmament this year’s increase is fairly 
moderate...What the bill may be next year is another matter’. 
March 16, 1935: The Economist reviews the future of defence spending in a lead editorial following 
Defence Estimates and a Defence White Paper of March 11, 1935 (Cmd. 4827). This paper has 
announced a new policy of rearmament but with no spending commitments.  It simply said that 
additional expenditure on the armaments of the defence services could no longer safely be 
postponed.  The Economist thinks that this will entail a change of gear such that ‘it is certain that the 
Defence Vote will show a further big increase next year’ 
April 13, 1935:  The budget plans envisage total estimated expenditure on defence of £124.2 million 
equivalent to £136 million at 1938 prices, as noted already.  The outturn is £136.9 million as 
spending jumps in 1935Q3. 
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It seems to be rearmament ... but it is unclear as to how much and how soon?  It is difficult to 
believe that anyone could at this stage be sure of the massive additional defence spending that 
would occur by 1938 but equally everyone should be expecting a considerable increase during the 
next fiscal year that will be sustained rather than transitory.  Chambers (2010) underlined the 
importance of rearmament for IPOs in aircraft manufacturing at this time. On previous assumptions, 
in 1935Q2 the projection was a constant expenditure of £34.0 million at 1938 prices with an NPV of 
606.2.  By 1935Q3 defence spending at current prices is running at an annual rate of about 30% 
higher than a year ago (and this carries on to the end of the fiscal year).  It is apparent that 
rearmament will be a lengthy process – say, at least 5 years.  In the light of The Economist’s 
commentary it does not seem excessive to suppose that agents expect the 1935/6 increase at this 
point and believe it will be maintained for the forecast horizon even though actual spending does 
not yet reflect the new policy stance.  So, the expected sequence of defence expenditure at 1938 
prices in 1935Q2 is taken to be £44.0 million each quarter over the horizon with an NPV = 784.4 so 
the news is +178.2. 
July 20, 1935:  A supplementary Defence Estimate of £5.3 million has been announced to cover a 
faster build-up of the Air Force.  The Economist remarks that this is ‘striking evidence of the scope 
and rapidity of this year’s expansion’. 
September 28, 1935:  In a recent speech Chamberlain (Chancellor of the Exchequer) has stressed 
that the UK’s defence forces have fallen to a dangerously low level and that greatly increased 
expenditure on the Navy and Air Force is required.  The Conservative Party conference is expected to 
recommend the immediate financing of such expenditure by a national defence loan of £150 to £250 
million.  The Economist strongly disapproves of this proposal. 
October 5, 1935:  Defence spending has sharply increased in the last quarter to £32.6 million (31% 
above the same quarter a year ago). 
January 4, 1936: Defence spending in 1935Q4 was £37.2 million (29% above the same quarter a year 
ago). 
February 8, 1936: The Economist features a special report on ‘Britain’s Air Programme’.  This 
suggests that it is now possible to get a fairly accurate idea of the cost of the expansion programme.  
Spending on the Air Force in 1935/36 will be £29.2 million compared with £20.2 million in 1934/35.  
Expenditure in 1936/37 will be £52 million.  From then on, there will be extra annual running costs of 
£10 million to add to the £20 million of 1934/35, the last ‘normal’ year. 
February 15, 1936: It has been widely reported in the press that a large defence loan is in prospect - 
£285 million according to The Times which seems well-informed.  The Economist also features a 
special report on ‘Britain’s Naval Expenditure’.  This suggests that the period of ‘truce’ under the 
Washington Treaty will end and foresees an ‘extraordinary’ programme of naval construction, 
including the replacement of 7 battleships, which might cost about £110 million over some years.  
However, it is not yet possible for provide an accurate forecast.   
February 22, 1936:  A further Supplementary Defence Estimate for £7.8 million has been issued 
bringing the fiscal year’s total to £13.1 million.  The Economist provides a review of defence policy in 
a lead editorial.  This notes that the press is agreed that there will be capital expenditure on defence 
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services amounting to £280 million over the next 3 or 4 years, as proposed by the Cabinet’s Defence 
Requirements Committee.  However, the situation with regard to the Navy is not yet clear and it 
may be that we can hang on to something like the status quo in terms of international agreements. 
March 7, 1936:   It is understood that the Defence Estimates will increase by £31 million next year.  
There will also be Supplementary estimates during the year which are hard to predict but could be 
£50 million and seem sure to be at least £25 million.  The latest ‘Statement Relating to Defence’ 
(Cmd. 5107) has been published on March 3.  In a lead editorial, The Economist describes this as a 
‘declaration of Governmental intentions, in broad and vague outline, without any indication of the 
cost of realising them’ and comments that ‘Gone, therefore, are those hopes, or fears, of the 
publication of a fully-fledged, detailed Government Defence Programme, including expenditure, 
over many years, amounting to hundreds of millions of pounds.’  Some aspects of the plans are 
visible in the White Paper and The Economist notes that 2 battleships will be built each year, 20 
more cruisers will be added to the fleet, total strength in first line aircraft will rise in 1937 from 2000 
to 2400, and the Army will be enlarged by 4 new infantry battalions. 
March 14, 1936: The Defence Estimates for 1936/37 have been published and at £158.2 million 
show an increase over the original Estimate for 1935/36 of £33.9 million.  The Economist points out 
that these figures do not include any allowance for the cost of the White Paper rearmament scheme 
which might require £40 million or even £80 million. 
April 4, 1936: Final figures for defence expenditure in 1935/36 were £136.9 million.  The Economist 
comments that this information does not change the outlook as discussed on March 14. 
April 25, 1936: The budget has confirmed a Defence Estimate of £158.2 million for 1936/37 which is 
equivalent to £167.7 million at 1938 prices.  The Chancellor of the Exchequer (Chamberlain) stated 
that additional expenditure on rearmament would exceed £20 million.  He also made an important 
policy announcement, namely, that he considered it proper to meet some of the costs of expanding 
the defence forces (though not maintaining them) by borrowing rather than from taxation. 
It seems clear that defence spending will continue to rise on a sustained basis but magnitudes are 
still unclear.  Given known spending next year of £167.7 million and supplementary estimates 
expected to be at least £25 million, it seems reasonable to think that annual spending for the 
medium term will be around £200 million, equivalent to £212 million at 1938 prices.  This means 
NPV = 944.4 compared with 784.4 on previous assumptions) so the news in 1936Q1 is +160.0.  
Historical research reveals that in February 1936, the Cabinet had agreed a programme of defence 
spending over the 5 years 1936-1940 of £1016 million (Peden, 1979) which is very similar. 
July 11, 1936: Supplementary estimates amounting to £20 million have been presented this week.  
Defence expenditure will be at least £54 million more than last year. 
November 28, 1936: A recently issued brokers’ circular predicts that next year’s Defence Estimate 
will be £220 million which The Economist describes as ‘not prima facie unreasonable’. 
January 2, 1937: Given that total expenditure in the first 3 quarters of the fiscal year has been 
announced as £126.7 million, The Economist says that is unlikely that defence spending in 1936/37 
will exceed £178.2 million. 
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January 23, 1937: The Economist in a lead editorial, notwithstanding that it thinks that Britain is on 
the verge of enormous expenditures on rearmament, fiercely opposes the idea of a Defence Loan 
which it says is now widely believed will be announced imminently, probably for £150 millions. 
February 13, 1937: The government has announced that it will introduce a bill (the Defence Loans 
Act) to permit it to borrow up to £400 million for defence expenditure over a period not exceeding 5 
years.  The Economist comments that the ‘effect will be to bring the country face to face with the 
stupendous scale of the preparations on which we are now embarked’. 
February 20, 1937: The government has published another White Paper, ‘Statement Relating to 
Defence Expenditure’ (Cmd. 5374).  This offers little precise information on the acceleration of the 
rearmament programme but says that it would be imprudent to expect total expenditure on defence 
in the next 5 years to be much less than £1500 million and that the level of expenditure in the next 2 
or 3 years will be very much heavier than in the current year. 
March 13, 1937:  Defence expenditure announced for next year to be financed either by borrowing 
or taxation is £277.7 million but there may well be additions to these estimates during the year. 
March 20, 1937: In a leading editorial, The Economist reflects on the details of future defence 
spending and comments that ‘the staggering scale of our war preparations begins to loom larger and 
larger’. 
There seems every reason to believe that future expenditure will be at £300 million per year (£300.2 
million in 1938 prices).  The new NPV = 1337.4 so the news in 1937Q1 is +393.0. 
April 3, 1937: Defence expenditure in the last fiscal year comes in at £186.1 million. 
April 24, 1937: The budget has confirmed defence expenditure for 1937/38 is expected to be £278.3 
million of which £80 million will be financed by borrowing.  The Chancellor (Chamberlain) does not 
expect any supplementary estimates this year. 
There is no news in 1937Q2. 
January 8, 1938:  The Economist notes that defence expenditure in the first 3 quarters of the fiscal 
year has totalled £172.9 million and, even assuming that expenditure surges in the last quarter in a 
similar way to last year, the total for the year 1937/38 seems likely to be at least £20 million below 
what was expected at the time of the budget. 
March 5, 1938: Another ‘Statement Relating to Defence’ (Cmd. 5682) has been published.  For 
1938/39, the Defence Estimates show expenditure of £343.2 million, of which £90 million will be 
financed by borrowing.  The White Paper also states that 1939/40 is expected to be the peak year 
and that total spending over the financial years 1937-41 will exceed £1500 million. 
March 12, 1938:  The Prime Minister (Chamberlain) has warned the House of Commons in a defence 
debate that expenditure levels will be substantially above the £1500 million envisaged in 1937. 
April 9, 1938:  In its Budget preview, The Economist suggests that events in Europe since the Defence 
Estimates were published will mean that actual expenditure in 1938/39 will exceed £343.2 million 
and there will be ‘heavy’ Supplementary Estimates during the year. 
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April 30, 1938: In his budget speech, the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Simon) stated that there 
might be heavy additional borrowing later in the year to finance the acceleration in the defence 
programme decided upon since the publication of the estimates in March. 
It is now clear that projections for defence spending have to be revised again.  There is a greater 
scale of rearmament and even in a new steady state spending in 1942/43 would be at least double 
the pre-1936 normal given the much increased size of the armed forces.  If we assume that the total 
through 1942/43 is £1600 million and the peak year is 1939/40, the expected sequence at 1938 
prices might look like this: 
  1939Q1 85.8 1940Q1 93.8 1941Q1 79.0 1942Q1 79.0 
1938Q2 85.8 1939Q2 93.8 1940Q2 79.0 1941Q2  1942Q2 et seq. 62.5 
1938Q3 85.8 1939Q3 93.8 1940Q3 79.0 1941Q3    
1938Q4 85.8 1939Q4 93.8 1940Q4 79.0 1941Q4    
 
The NPV = 1436.2 so the news in 1938Q2 is + 98.8. 
July 16, 1938: A Supplementary Estimate of £22.9 million for the RAF has been announced. 
The outturn for defence expenditure in the fiscal year 1938/39 would be £382.5 million about £40 
million above the budget figure.  We assume that this is predicted at this point in the year in the light 
of this extra spending on the air force and the Chancellor’s comments in the budget.  This implies a 
new NPV of 1445.8 and that the news in 1938Q3 is + 29.1. 
The time series for Defence News is reported in Table 1. 
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Table 1.  Defence News: Estimates of Changes in Net Present Value of Expected Defence 
Expenditure (£ million, 1938 prices). 
1920Q1  1927Q1  1934Q1  
1920Q2  1927Q2   +2.2 1934Q2  
1920Q3  1927Q3  1934Q3   +44.3 
1920Q4   +36.0 1927Q4  1934Q4  
1921Q1 +112.4 1928Q1  1935Q1  
1921Q2  1928Q2  1935Q2 +178.2 
1921Q3   -36.7 1928Q3  1935Q3  
1921Q4  1928Q4  1935Q4  
1922Q1  1929Q1  1936Q1 +160.0 
1922Q2  1929Q2  1936Q2  
1922Q3  1929Q3  1936Q3  
1922Q4   -10.9 1929Q4  1936Q4  
1923Q1  1930Q1  1937Q1 +393.0 
1923Q2   +72.4 1930Q2  1937Q2  
1923Q3  1930Q3  1937Q3  
1923Q4     -0.9 1930Q4  1937Q4  
1924Q1  1931Q1  1938Q1  
1924Q2   -22.1 1931Q2  +7.0 1938Q2   +98.8 
1924Q3  1931Q3  1938Q3   +29.1 
1924Q4  1931Q4  1938Q4  
1925Q1  1932Q1    
1925Q2  1932Q2 +52.0   
1925Q3  1932Q3    
1925Q4  1932Q4    
1926Q1  1933Q1    
1926Q2   +0.9 1933Q2    
1926Q3  1933Q3    
1926Q4  1933Q4    
 
Source: own calculations, see text. 
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